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Parametric and non-parametric change detection 
algorithms are applied to the problem of detecting 
changes in the direction of traffic flow. The directionality 
of the change in a network flow is assumed to have an 
objective or target. The particular problem of detecting 
distributed denial of service attacks from distributed 
observations is presented as a working framework. The 
performance of our change detection algorithms is 




We are interested in detecting and classifying 
anomalous changes in the behavior of a network caused 
from distributed sources of the disturbance, including 
maliciously planned attacks with goal the disruption of 
the network. More specifically we are interested in 
detecting changes in the network flow, identifying 
abnormal changes, and extracting the characteristics of 
the changes, as soon as possible. Examples include the 
spreading of active worms through web servers, email 
viruses and distributed denial of service attacks.  
 
Networks of interest include communication 
networks as well as sensor networks. We are principally 
interested in developing efficient and high performance 
algorithms for these problems while utilizing only passive 
monitoring of the time histories of network flows and 
other key network parameters at a small subset of nodes. 
In particular we consider a subset of highly connected 
nodes from where we can infer properties about the 
network state. Detecting a problem such as an attack or 
intrusion early in its development or spreading, before it 
has reached its full force can help in the assignment of 
resources to guarantee a reliable operation or in executing 
a rapid response to contain or nullify an attack. For 
example a denial of service attack becomes apparent in its 
final phase by observing the traffic flow in the network. 
We are interested in the “quickest detection” problem 
when the attack is distributed and coordinated from 
several nodes against a targeted node.  
 
We investigate first the problem of a spreading 
congestion attack that incrementally compromises nodes. 
The behavior pattern as observed by different nodes in the 
network will be different from a panic mode (flash 
crowd). This problem is investigated as a step towards 
analyzing more complex distributed attacks.  
 
A typical distributed denial of service attack involves 
sending a large number of packets from multiple sources 
to a single destination causing excessive amounts of 
endpoint, and possibly transit network bandwidth to be 
consumed. (Houle and Weaver, 2001). Our goal is to 
detect when a distributed denial of service is taking place 
in one sub-network of a transit (core) network comprised 
only on routers. We are assuming the transit network 
itself is not the target of the attack, but it is being used by 
the attack to reach the victim. 
 
Various techniques have been proposed for 
mitigation of denial of service attacks that require the 
identification of the routers participating (involuntarily) in 
the attack. Most of these techniques consume a significant 
amount of router resources so it is advisable to use them 
only when needed. Some examples provided in some 
Cisco Routers are TCP Intercept and “Committed Access 
Rate.” Some related work is also presented in (Bohacek, 
2002) where the key step in the proposed denial of service 
mitigation algorithm consists in identifying the routers 
forwarding the malicious traffic. 
 
We are addressing this monitoring and detection of 
abnormal behavior problem as a space-time inference 
problem. That is we look at the collection of the time 
histories at the sensing nodes together and not in isolation. 
This set of time histories constitutes our “monitoring 
data” or observations. We consider parametric and non-
parametric models for the monitored statistics. The 
connectivity, logical and physical, of the nodes and the 
topology of the network influence the time history of the 
observations, and consequently the form of the algorithm 
and its properties. We provide a novel formulation of the 
problem as sequential space-time change detection on a 
graph. The mathematical techniques we use for detecting 
an attack are thus based on change detection theory. In a 
distributed environment a small change in local nodes can 
be correlated with the state at different nodes to provide a 
global view and early warning about the state of the 
network. Distributed change detection problems on 
graphs are a novel formulation and problem.  
  
More specifically for the denial of service attack 
problem, we use a “directionality” framework, which 
gives us a way to compute the severity and directionality 
of the change. The “severity” represents a composite 
hypothesis test that can be solved explicitly when the data 
are Gaussian. We also introduce a heuristic distributed 
change detection mechanism for “correlating” the alarms 
in a subset of monitored nodes. Given an alarm as a pair 
(direction and severity) we correlate the severity of the 
alarms with alarms from other nodes in the “same 
direction.” 
 
Finally we are investigating the effects of mobility on 
the solution to these problems. Mobility creates changing 
topology of the underlying network and of the associated 
graph. The resulting problems are treated in the 
framework of dynamic space-time inferencing based on 
dynamic graph models.  
 
 
2. DETECTION OF SELF-PROPAGATING CODE 
 
We have investigated the problem of detecting self-
propagating code (worms) spreading over a network. 
Most active worms spreading over the Internet 
compromised hosts in a random way. For example Code 
Red spread by launching 99 threads that generated 
random IP addresses. The worm itself is normally small 
(Code Red I was about 4KB) and it only takes 40 bytes 
for a TCP SYN packet to determine if a service is 
accessible. So in order to detect self-propagating code we 
should add semantic information, which might vary 
depending on the worm (Nimda used several ways to 
spread itself). The most general-purpose information we 
might need is the number of TCP SYN packets seen.  A 
distributed observation of a rise in TCP SYN packets (or a 
rise in the rate of change in the arrival of these packets) in 
several nodes of the network might indicate the presence 
of a worm scanning IP addresses for vulnerable hosts. The 
use of host unreachable messages and connection 
attempts to routers as a way of detecting worms will be 
less reliable while the worm is “getting off the ground” if 
it uses a hit-list scanning (Staniford et al. 2002.) The 
observations can be made at different participating ISPs 
enforcing policies for blocking self-propagating code 
once it is detected. 
 
Our overall goal is to develop automated mechanisms 
for detecting worms based on their spread traffic patterns 
from widespread sensors (later attacks). In analyzing the 
associated segmentation of flows in complex networks, 
past research has revealed that the connectivity of the 
network influences the properties of spreading 
mechanisms for various types of attacks. In this context 
the behavior of different types of networks has been 
investigated (at least on a preliminary basis):  random 
graphs, small-world networks (small path length, 
unusually large clustering coefficient), scale-free 
networks. For example it is now well known that the 
Internet router topology has a heavy tail distribution, 
which manifests in a core connected group and a 
statistically significant number of low degree nodes (a so 
called scale-free network) (Albert and Barabasi, 2002.) 
 
Various classes of random graphs/networks have 
recently attracted attention in relation to various dynamic 
properties of the Internet and other networks. These 
include the Erdös-Rényi “random graph” model, where 
one starts with N nodes and connects every pair of nodes 
with probability p, ending up with a graph with 
approximately pN(N-1)/2 edges distributed randomly, and 
with the typical distance between two nodes scaling as 
log(N). In such a network clusters of “like” or “close” 
nodes form. A key parameter in the analysis and 
discrimination between graphs is the clustering coefficient 
of a node i. Consider a node i with ki  edges connecting it 
to ki other nodes. If nearest neighbors were part of the 
cluster there will be  ki(ki-1)/2 edges between them. The 
clustering coefficient of the network at node i is the ratio 
between edges that actually exist between these ki nodes, 
Ei, and the total number                                  . The 
network clustering coefficient is the average of the Ci. 
 
It turns out that the clustering coefficients, and more 
importantly their variations, are very useful in classifying 
different types of networks. In a random graph C = p, 
while in real networks C is much larger than in a 
comparable random graph. Another important parameter 
in the description of a network is the node degree, i.e. the 
number of edges emanating from a node in a graph. The 
important discriminant is the degree distribution:         
Pr[a randomly selected node has exactly k edges] = P(k). 
In a random graph the majority of nodes have 
approximately the same degree close to the average 
degree of the network kav, and the degree distribution is 
Poisson with peak P(kav). On the other hand in most real 
large networks degree distribution deviates significantly 
from Poisson: it has a power law tail P(k)  k -   (scale-
free networks). Current research in dynamics of complex 
networks tries to identify basic dynamic interactions to 
explain these characteristics. 
 
Recent studies have revealed on a preliminary basis, 
that graph topology, and in particular its classification 
from the perspectives of clustering coefficients and 
degree distribution, is intimately related to the robustness 
of the network when there is failure or attack.  A key 
question is: “what happens to average path length 
between two nodes when the network fails (i.e. nodes are 
disabled at random) vs when the network is under attack 
(i.e. nodes with highest degree are disabled first). It turns 
2 /( ( 1))i i i iC E k k= −
out that there are strong indications that scale free 
networks are very robust to random failures but 
susceptible to targeted attacks, while ad hoc networks are 
very robust to targeted attacks. 
 
Figure 1 below, illustrates a typical scale-free 
network. As can easily be seen in such a model there is a 
set of subnetworks connected through a much smaller 
subset of key nodes (routers). In such a network the 
distribution of the node degree is heavy tailed, meaning 
that there is higher than typical chance that there are some 
nodes with many edges connected to them. Such nodes 
help spread attacks rapidly and are themselves primary 
targets of attacks. The network of Internet routers and the 
















Figure1: The synthetic experimental network 
 
The analysis of active worm spreading on graphs, 
provides a first step towards the analysis of spreading of 
more sophisticated attacks in a network. Fast spreading 
Internet worms (active worms) do not resemble traditional 
models of epidemic spreading on a graph. Traditional 
epidemic spreading on graphs considered nodes infecting 
only their neighbors. On the other hand in the Internet 
router graph the spread of active worms (Code Red, 
Nimda) is not limited to diffusion schemes due to the 
utilization of random scanning of nodes whose path 
length is in general greater than one. We have 
investigated experimentally the spreading of active worms 
using random scanning in a synthetic network. The time 
(number of hops) it takes to infect all the nodes is longer 
in regular lattices than in small world or random graphs. 
Naïve change detection would use a Poisson process for 
the beginning of connections and a sudden increase (in 
measured traffic rate) would create an alarm. Aggregation 
(fusion) of different sensors (located at different nodes) 
would prevent false alarms but would delay detection. 
 
The synthetic network that we experimented with is 
shown in Figure 1; it has 100 nodes. It appears to have 4 
autonomous systems (AS). The gateways are high degree 
nodes (important nodes). Gateways for AS 1 are nodes 32 
and 21. Gateways for AS 2 are nodes 24, 67. Gateways 
for AS 3 are nodes 22, 44. Gateways for AS 4 are nodes 
71, 33, 23. The node degree distributions, in this network, 
for the core cluster and for the “AS” networks are heavy 
tailed. The average path length of this network is 4.3. 
 
We provide next a brief description of some of the 
experimental details in our investigations. Each node can 
act as a source or a sink.  The flows of the network consist 
of “requests” in analogy to the “TCP-SYN” packets 
required for initiating a connection. The capacity of the 
links is infinite. The cost  (in time) for a “request” to go 
through each link is of one time-step. 
 
Under normal mode each node has a waiting time for 
initiating connections, which is modeled as either a Pareto 
or Exponential distribution. In either case the mean was 
set to two times the average path length in the network 
(round trip time (RTT)). A “Panic mode” simulates the 
situation where ¼ of the nodes in the network will attempt 
to contact at times t = 50 + G,..., t = 50 + 5 + G (where G 
is a random variable with Gamma distribution and 
parameters g = 2, t = 2) one of the nodes that are being 
monitored (node #6). Under an anomaly mode, an 
infection is modeled similar to the spread of Code Red I 
over the Internet, (we are considering vulnerable nodes). 
The attack starts with a single node infected at time t = 
150. Once infected, a node spreads the self-propagating 
code by launching a specified number of threads, which 
generate random node numbers and then tries to contact 
them. Each thread waits for the round trip time after 
sending a request to the target before trying to contact any 
other node.  
 
In figures 2- 4 below we present some representative 

















Figure 2: Flows when each infected node runs 3 threads  
 
In the experimental network of Figure 1 we monitor 
the number of “TCP-SYN” packets going through 10 
nodes with the highest degree (number of links). Nodes 
 
 
21,22,23,24 and 33 are Gateways. The other nodes belong 
to the highly connected cluster in between the AS’s. The 
surge of traffic flows at times immediately after the 













Figure 3: Infection time per node when the self-   
propagating code runs three threads 
 
The basic problem formulation for automated change 
detection algorithms is as follows: Given the observed 
data from one or more nodes decide as fast as possible if a 
spreading attack is taking place. A more complicated 
problem is the combined detection/classification problem: 
Given several possible models or hypotheses that may 
have generated the observed data at one or more nodes 
decide as fast as possible if a spreading attack is taking 
place and the type of the attack. The methodologies we 
are using to analyze these problems proceed along two 
main ideas: developing generalized likelihood ratio 
(GLR) approach for on-line algorithms; developing filter 
bank algorithms (using HMMs). We are also investigating 
the development of robust non-parametric algorithms 
using cumulative sum (CUSUM) and Girshik-Rubin-
Shiryaev (GRSh) statistics. In sequential versions of the 




Figure 4: Preliminary picture showing the detection of 
the worm early in its development.  
Change detection and quickest detection is a subject 
that has been investigated intensively through the years 
due to its wide applicability. We refer to the excellent 
references (Basseville and Nikiforov, 1993) (Shiryaev, 
1978). Most of the algorithms and work to date have used 
i.i.d. observations. Performance of such an algorithm is 
shown in Figure 4 below.    
 
 
3. CHANGE DETECTION IN A  
NETWORK FLOW PATTERN 
 
3.1 Problem formulation 
 
Most change detection algorithms applied to network 
traffic use non-parametric statistics as it is very 
complicated to know, or model the pre-change 0P  and the 
post-change 1P  distributions of an observation of the 
network flow at all times by parametric families (Blâzek 
et al., 2001;Wang et al. 2002.) 
 
One such non-parametric sequential method to detect 
changes in the mean that we will be looking at is given by 
a threshold of the statistic: 
{ }1max 0,k k k k kS S N m c−= + − −  (1) 
where kN  can represent for example the number of 
packets seen in an interval of time tt k∆ = , km is a 
historical estimate of 0[ ]kE N  and kc  is a positive 
deterministic sequence chosen experimentally to 
minimize the average detection delay.  The stopping time 
is then  
 min{ : }kk S hτ = ≥  (2) 
where h is the given threshold. 
 
We take a new approach for identifying Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks by a set of nodes in a 
transit network. The basic idea is that at each highly 
connected node, the data tends to aggregate from the 
distributed sources towards the destination, giving a sense 
of “directionality” to the attack. This directionality 
concept provides us a framework to design change 
detection algorithms that are going to be less sensitive to 
changes in the average intensity of the overall traffic and 
will focus in differentiating the different random 
fluctuations of the network traffic versus fluctuations 
where there is a clear change in the direction of the flow 
at a given node. We are considering “packets” in a very 
broad and general way, but clearly our approach can be 
extended to monitor certain specific packet types given 
the right protocol. For example we might be interested in 
measuring only TCP SYN-ACK response packets for 
identifying a “reflected distributed denial of service 
attack”, or ICMP packets for identifying ping floods.  




























Let’s assume we are monitoring node d in Figure 5. 
Let ,d mkX denote the total number of packets sent by d 
through the link (d,m), where ( )m N d∈  denotes a 
neighbor of d, N(d). Let dkX  denote the vector with 
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 + ϒ = + ϒ 
  
 (3) 
where v  is a non-negative scalar and ϒ (in the case of  
three observed links) is one of the usual basis vectors of 
the three dimensional Euclidean space. Namely: 
 
1 0 0
0 , 1 , 0
0 0 1
a b c
     
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So in Figure 5, if node d suddenly starts a broadcast, 
there will be a change in the mean of all the processes, but 
we are not interested in such a change. Instead, if there 
are attackers in the sub networks attached to b and c, and 
they target a host in the network attached to a by flooding 
it, there will be a change in the direction aϒ .  Testing 
“directions” should help us discriminate unwanted false 
alarms due random fluctuations of flows. 
 
 
Figure 5: Transit network composed of nodes a, b, c, d. 
We monitor all outgoing links of node d. 
To formalize our ideas we consider the framework 
discussed in (Basseville and Nikiforov, 1993) of change 
detection in a known direction but unknown magnitude of 
the change. Our problem is a little bit different in that we 
are considering an M-ary sequential hypothesis testing 
problem and in that we not allow changes with negative 
values for v , i.e. we impose the restriction 0v ≥  

























 + ϒ=  + ϒ
 ≥+ ϒ
 (4) 
where changet is an unknown time when the change occurs.  
We run in parallel a GLR in each possible direction mϒ  
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Only the test m that reaches its given threshold is stopped. 
The threshold ,d mh for each of the parallel tests is 
selected given a fixed false alarm rate probability. 
 
Equation (5) has a closed form solution when the 
distributions are assumed to be Gaussian ( )0 ,d dθ Σ . In 
this case we get the constrained optimization problem: 
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If the restriction is active, then ( ) 0
m
kv j =  
 
Intuitively we are projecting the difference between 
all available sample means and the mean 0
dθ  into each of 
the possible directions mϒ , selecting the time step that 





k mv jθ + ϒ , i.e. when we “think” the 
sample mean started moving in the mϒ  direction. The 
uncorrelated covariance (in our case) is just a weighting 
parameter for being cautious about declaring a change in 
the mean too soon if the process is observed to have large 
fluctuations around the mean. 
 
We tested the robustness of this approach even when 
the distribution is not Gaussian, as long as we are 
computing the mean and covariance in a window of time, 
much larger than our false alarm delay, to keep mean and 
covariance “up to date”. Although the number of packets 
through a link does not follow a Gaussian distribution, the 
analysis is still valid based on second order statistics of 
the flows. The mean and the variance are easily learned 
and the model is used to provide an approximate picture 
of changes in direction of the flow. We are primarily 
concerned here about changes in the direction of the flow 
and not its intensity per se. 
 
We also use the non-parametric test ,d mkS given by 
equation (1) to test for changes in the mean of the 
utilization of the link (d,m) in the time interval k. Note 
that one main difference is that for testing a change in the 
link m, ,d mkS  does not use information from the other 
links of node d whereas ,d mkg  does. A possible use of the 
information contained in all the links from d is to compute 
a non-parametric statistic that measures the changes in the 



















This approach has the added advantage that a positive 
change in the mean of ,d mkρ  tends to yield a negative 












Experimental validation shows that the process ,d mkρ has 
fewer variations than its unormalized counterpart and will 
be more amenable to a mean computation and the usage 
of the non-parametric statistic (1). 
 
3.2 Correlation mechanism 
 
So far we have been focusing on detecting a change 
in a single node. One of the main advantages in having 
several nodes under monitoring is that we can perform a 
correlation of the statistics between the different nodes in 
order to decrease the detection delay given a fixed false 
alarm rate probability. The alarm correlation can be 
performed by several methods. Here we propose a simple 
algorithm that will only require the knowledge of the 
routing tables for the nodes being monitored.   
 
We want a mechanism to aggregate the different 
statistics at each monitored node. Clearly the correlation 
mechanism cannot be multiplicative, because if we are 
monitoring a node physically unable to detect the attack 
(a node that is not in the routing path of any of the 
attackers and the victim) the low value of the computed 
statistic of this node will adversely affect any small 
information that any other node might have related to the 
attack. On the other hand the computed statistics kg  for 
all nodes can vary to different scales of magnitude 
yielding a biased addition. To cope with this problem we 











ϕ =  (9) 
If none of our monitored nodes has raised an alarm, the 
number of monitored nodes will bound ,d m
k
d
ϕ∑ . This 
can be in turn interpreted as a new upper bound for a 
“collective” threshold and can be selected given a false 
alarm rate probability. Selecting which statistics to 
correlate (add) is a key issue. In keeping with our 
“directionality” framework we will correlate only the 
statistics relating two or more nodes to a common node. 
That is the reason we need the routing table information 
of our monitored nodes.   
 
The algorithm is as follows: 
Given two nodes d and e, 
For each link d->m in d{ 
 For each link e->n in e{ 
If there is a node f 
reachable through the 
routing tables of d->m and 
e->n, then correlate the 
normalized statistic of  





In the following section we apply this formulation for 
the case of two nodes, but it can be extended recursively 
when we are monitoring three or more nodes. 
 
 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS AND EVALUATION 
 
For our experimental results we used the network 
simulation software ns2. We created a script to generate a 
random scale-free transit network topology with a given 
number of sub networks. We will focus in one of our 
realizations given in Figure 6. It consists of 15 transit 
nodes performing only routing between 12 subnetworks, 
each with 65 hosts each.  During the normal operation of 
the network each of these 780 hosts selects randomly a 
host in another sub network, and establishes an On-Off 
source connection with Pareto distributed times. The 
routing protocol selects a route with the least number of 
hops towards a given destination. 
 
The attack is simulated with a given number of 
compromised nodes in different sub networks. During the 
attack, each of these nodes will start a constant bit rate 
connection towards a specific node. The rate of the 
attackers was varied to test the detection algorithm with 
different percentage of attack packets circulating over the 
transit network at a given time. We considered 7 
attackers. One in each of the sub networks connected to 
nodes 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11 and 13.  The victim is in the 




Figure 6: The transit network consists of 15 routers Each 
“cloud” represents a subnetwork 
Some typical link usage characteristics can be seen in 
Figure 7. We first tested the performance of the statistics 
,d m
kS  and 
,d m
kg  at individual nodes. With the network 
under normal operation we experimentally obtained the 
thresholds for each statistic for a false alarm rate of 0.003. 
Figure 7: Node 6 uses node 0 to reach 14.  An attack  
                 occupying 2.5% percent of the transit network  
                 traffic was started at k = 350. 
 
Figure 8: Average detection delay per node when we  
                monitor nodes 0, 1, 2, 7. Detection delay of 1 is  
                same as the average delay for a false alarm. 
 
We selected the nodes 0, 1, 2, 7 to test the detection 
delay of the statistics independently of each other. The 
results can be seen in Figure 8, where the average delay of 
detection is computed between the four nodes for 
different percentages of the amount of traffic the attack 
generates over the transit network. Node 0 had the 
smallest delay, as it is a node where most of the traffic 
towards 14 gets agglomerated, giving a large change in 




The correlation mechanism can be applied to 
decrease the detection delay when we are monitoring 
more than one node. Lets consider the case of two nodes 
far (in the number of hops) from the victim. In Figure 6 
we will pick nodes 6 and 3 for the correlation. 
Furthermore if we consider an attack reaching less than 
2% of the transit network traffic it will be very difficult to 
detect any abnormal change without a global integrated 
view of the statistics at different nodes. For testing our 
correlation algorithm we will start at k = 1 an attack 
reaching 1.5% of all traffic at the transit network. Again 
the attack is towards a host in the sub network of node 14.  
 
The normalized statistics are computed for each link 
in the nodes. Figure 9 shows the normalized statistics for 
node 6. The routing tables required for the correlation 
algorithm are in Tables 1,  2.  
 
TABLE 1: ROUTING TABLE FOR NODE 6 






(6,sub network)  
 
TABLE 2: ROUTING TABLE FOR NODE 3 





(3,sub network)  
 
By simple inspection of the routing tables we see that 
we need to correlate link (6,0) with (3,1) because nodes 6 
and 3 use them to reach nodes 0, 1 and 14. Similarly, the 
link (6,11) must be correlated with (3,11), link (6,4) with 
(3,4), link (6,7) with (3,13), and (6,7) with (3,1). 
 
The results of our correlation between all allowable 
normalized statistics are shown in Figure 10. It is clear 
that the correlation of the normalized statistics at nodes 6 
and 3 gives a better resolution of the attack than the 
statistics of 6 and 3 alone while discriminating the 
uncorrelated random fluctuations of the traffic intensity 
that cause most of the false alarms. 
 
 
Figure 9: All normalized statistics for node 6. Solid dark 
curve is the normalized statistic for link (6,0). 
Circles identify the statistic from 6 to its sub 
net. This statistic raises a false alarm at k=42. 
 
 
Figure 10: Dark solid curve is the correlated statistic of 
links (6,0) and (3,1). The other dotted curves represent the 
correlated statistics of the remaining allowable links. 
Not only can we detect the attack (depending on the 
new correlation threshold), but also we can diminish the 
impact of the false alarm originating at node 6. However 
another important conclusion is that without the need to 
extract or store header information from the packets 
transmitted through the network, we are able to infer 
(from the intersection of the two routing tables for the 
“winning” correlated statistic of the links (6,0) and (3,1)) 
the only three possible targets: Namely nodes 0, 1 and 14.  
 
A simple marginal constant reduction in the delay 
detection such as that obtained with ,d mkg vs. 
,d m
kS  can 
provide significant help when we correlate the statistics 
because constant gains will get multiplied by the number 
of nodes participating in the detection reducing 





In this paper we have investigated the problem of 
detecting anomalous behavior and distributed attacks in a 
network. We investigated detection of spreading of active 
code based on the spatio-temporal pattern variations in the 
flows of a set of nodes. We also investigated detection of 
distributed denial of service attacks. We have formulated 
these problems as distributed change detection problems 
on a graph. We described several algorithms and their 
performance. 
 
Future work includes: identification of the most 
promising models to use for the network and for the data 
generation mechanisms for the monitoring data; learning 
either the parameters of the models assumed for normal or 
abnormal data generation, or learning the corresponding 
data pattern; more detailed analysis of the distributed 
“quickest detection” on graphs; analysis of the trade-off 
between correct detection and/or classification and false 
alarms; investigation of these problems in the context of 
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